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Introduction 
The tranquillity of the World Economic Forum (WEF) at Davos in 2015 was disturbed by a 
startling report from the anti-poverty charity Oxfam that global wealth is becoming 
concentrated heavily among a tiny super-wealthy elite. The vast publicly funded global 
stimulus effort to revive economies following the financial devastation caused by the global 
financial crisis has not prevented a surge in the concentration of wealth in the period 2010-
2014. (Figure 1) Oxfam employing Credit Suisse data show that 2010 proved an inflection 
point in the global distribution of wealth and that by 2014 the richest one per cent of people 
in the world possessed 48 per cent of global wealth, leaving the other 99 per cent of humanity 
with the remaining 52 per cent (Oxfam 2015; Credit Suisse 2015).  
However the projections for the near future were even more alarming with the continuing 
increase in the wealth of the richest one per cent and the reduction of the wealth of the bottom 
99% till 2016 when the richest one per cent will have seized more than half the wealth in the 
world (Figure 2). Of course there is extreme inequality within the 99 per cent of the 
population who are not super rich, and much of the international research and policy has 
focused upon the persistence of absolute poverty in the world with hundreds of millions of 
people still living in hunger which the new UN development goals are focused upon. But the 
poor are very widespread in the world, and Credit Suisse estimates that 3.4 billion people 
more than 71 per cent of all adults in the world have wealth below US$ 10,000.  
An issue that has received less attention is the extreme range of wealth in the richest one per 
cent.  Oxfam and Credit Suisse illustrate that there is a category of the super-rich who have 
wealth comparable to the GDP of many countries, and that the wealth of the super-wealthy is 
advancing very rapidly: for example the 388 richest billionaires in the world in 2010 had the 
same wealth as the total wealth of 50 per cent of the world’s population. But by 2014 the 





population. The United States dominates the ranks of the super-rich in all categories from 
billionaires to ultra-high net worth (UHNW) individuals (US$50 million plus), to millionaires 
(Credit Suisse 2015: 26-7). The United States has 46 per cent of the global millionaires, and 
has 48 per cent of the UHNW rich. A claim could reasonably be made that not only is 
inequality becoming extreme within the United States, but that the United States is leading 
the world towards increasing inequality. 
Figure 1 
Share of global wealth of the top 1% and bottom 99% respectively 
Figure 2  
Share of global wealth of the top 1% and bottom 99% respectively: The trend 2014-2020  
 
In recent years the rediscovery that extreme inequality is returning to advanced economies 
has become widespread. What is at issue is the causes of this inequality. It is becoming clear 
that the wider population, particularly in Anglo-American economies have not shared in the 
growing wealth of the countries concerned, and that the majority of this wealth is being 
transferred on a continuous and systemic basis into the hands of the very rich. As the 
financialisation of these economies has continued, with the rapid growth and transmission of 
financial flows and the penetration of finance into every aspect of human activity, it is those 
who already have considerable accumulations of wealth who seem to benefit most, and this 
acute increase in inequality is particularly evident in the United States. Janet Yellen, Chair of 
the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve has stated:  
“The distribution of income and wealth in the United States has been widening more 
or less steadily for several decades, to a greater extent than in most advanced 
countries… The past several decades have seen the most sustained rise in inequality 
since the 19th century after more than 40 years of narrowing inequality following the 
Great Depression. By some estimates, income and wealth inequality are near their 
highest levels in the past hundred years, much higher than the average during that 
time span and probably higher than for much of American history before then. It is no 
secret that the past few decades of widening inequality can be summed up as 
significant income and wealth gains for those at the very top and stagnant living 





compatible with values rooted in our nation’s history, among them the high value 
Americans have traditionally placed on equality of opportunity… to the extent that 
opportunity itself is enhanced by access to economic resources, inequality of 
outcomes can exacerbate inequality of opportunity, thereby perpetuating a trend of 
increasing inequality” (Yellen 2014:1; Morelli et al 2014; Atkinson, Piketty and Saez 
2011; Saez and Zucman 2014). 
While the Anglo-American economies are seeing a return to the extremes of inequality last 
witnessed in the 19
th
 century, the causes of this inequality are changing. In the 19
th
 century 
great fortunes often were still inherited, or derived by entrepreneurs from the ownership and 
control of productive assets. By the late 20
th
 century as Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011) 
and others have highlighted, the sustained and rapid inflation in top income shares have made 
a significant contribution to the accelerating rate of income inequality: 
“Most countries experience a dramatic drop in top income shares in the first part of 
the twentieth century in general due to shocks to top capital incomes during the wars 
and depression shocks. Top income shares do not recover in the immediate post-war 
decades. However, over the last thirty years, top income shares have increased 
substantially in English speaking countries and in India and China but not in 
continental European countries or Japan. This increase is due in part to an 
unprecedented surge in top wage incomes. As a result, wage income comprises a 
larger fraction of top incomes than in the past” (Atkinson, Piketty and Saez 2011:3). 
Explanations for the increasing rate of inequality have focused upon changes in political 
economy as occurred in the Reagan and Thatcher administration neo-liberal reforms, macro-
economic transformations and recurrent financial crises, the impact of globalisation, and the 
replacement of progressive by regressive taxation as Atkinson, Piketty and Saez have 
examined. However one dynamic for the rapid and widespread intensification of inequality 
which has been relatively ignored is the transformation of corporate governance in the later 
decades of the 20
th
 century from a technocratic managerialist professionalism which regarded 
the objectives of the corporation to deliver value to all stakeholders, enhancing the prosperity 
of the economy and society in the process, to a much narrower and doctrinaire sense of 
shareholder primacy in which maximising shareholder value became the sole objective of the 
corporation: “In recent years a growing consensus has emerged in favour of the shareholder-





shareholder ownership rights but on efficiency grounds: whoever the immediate and direct 
beneficiaries of shareholder orientation, it is argued; it ultimately indirectly benefits everyone 
by ensuring the maximization of aggregate social wealth. The prevalence of this view has 
caused the distributional dimensions of corporate governance to be neglected” (Ireland 
2005:1) 
As the financialisation of the economies of the advanced economies has proceeded, and 
corporations themselves have increasingly been transformed into financial entities, the 
ownership of all financial assets has increasingly skewed towards the very rich. From the end 
of the recession in 2009 through 2011 (the last year for which Census Bureau wealth data are 
available), the 8 million households in the U.S. with a net worth above $836,033 saw their 
aggregate wealth rise by an estimated $5.6 trillion, while the 111 million households with a 
net worth at or below that level saw their aggregate wealth decline by an estimated $0.6 
trillion (Fry and Taylor 2013:2). Whilst increasing inequality has accompanied 
financialisation and globalisation throughout the world, it is in the Anglo-American world 
that many of the impulses towards financialisation and globalisation have originated, and 
specifically the dynamics of corporate governance and equity markets, once captured by the 
doctrines of shareholder primacy and the imperative of maximising shareholder value, were 
at the centre of the insistent production of increased inequality.  
This analysis will consider the dimensions of financialization of the international economy 
and how this has produced a more intensive and integrated mode of accumulation. With the 
increasing translation of corporations into financial entities, how the dominant shareholder 
primacy mode of corporate governance has served to compound inequality is examined. The 
damaging impact of maximising shareholder value is investigated, both in terms of the long 
term prospects of corporations, but also in aggressively producing increased inequality in the 
economy and society. Finally the ultimate paradoxical outcome of agency theory and 
shareholder value is highlighted as the explosion of executive reward in the last two decades 
in the Anglo-American countries. 
 
Financialization 
Financial innovations and financial cycles have periodically impacted substantially on 





Rajan 2010; Phillips 2009; Dunbar 2011; Akerlof and Shiller 2009; Das 2011; Sorkin 2009; 
Johnson and Kwak 2010). However, the new global era of financialization is qualitatively 
different from earlier regimes. Global finance is now typified by a more international, 
integrated and intensive mode of accumulation, a new business imperative of the 
maximisation of shareholder value, and a remarkable capacity to become an intermediary in 
every aspect of daily life. Hence finance as a phenomenon today is more universal, 
aggressive and pervasive than ever before (Krippner 2005; 2012; Epstein 2005; Davis 2009). 
 
The costs and benefits of the rapid financialisation of advanced industrial economies have 
been debated for some time (Martin 2002; Erturk et al 2008; Langley 2008; Davis 2009). 
Competing definitions of “financialization” highlight different dimensions of the problem: 
•  the growing dominance of capital market financial systems over bank-based 
financial systems; 
•  significant increases in financial transactions, real interest rates, the 
profitability of financial firms and the share of national income accruing to the 
holders of financial assets (Epstein 2005); 
•  the explosion of financial trading with a myriad of new financial instruments; 
•  the “pattern of accumulation in which profit making occurs increasingly 
through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity 
production” (Krippner 2005); 
•  the ascendancy of “shareholder value” as a mode of corporate governance 
(Aglietta and Reberioux 2005); 
•  the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and 
financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international 
economies (Dore 2008). 
These dimensions are extremely wide ranging, causing Dawe to comment “Financialization is 
a bit like ‘globalization’, a convenient word for a bundle of more or less discrete structural 
changes in the economies of the industrialized world” (van der Zwan 2013). Multiple changes 





institutions increasingly displacing other sectors of the economy as the source of profitable 
activity; the insistent financialisation of non-financial corporations through a regime of 
maximising shareholder value and the emphasis on financial metrics; and the penetration of 
finance into every aspect of life as people are increasingly incorporated into financial activity. 
In the US, UK and Europe the assets of financial institutions have grown vastly relative to 
GDP, as finance has positioned itself at the centre of all economic and social life (Figure 3). 
Figure  3 
Financial Assets in Multiples of GDP 
 
The international expansion of financial markets and institutions amounts for Krippner to a 
new “pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial channels 
rather than through trade and commodity production” (Krippner 2005). The finance sector 
has progressively increased its share of GDP, and even for non-financial corporations the 
pursuit of interest, dividends and capital gains outweigh any interest in productive 
investment. As non-financial corporations have become increasingly drawn into a financial 
paradigm, they have less capital available for productive activity despite increasing profits 
from financial activity (Lazonick 2012). A combination of the accumulation of debt and the 
volatility of asset prices has increased systemic risk, leading to the increasing intensity of 
boom–bust cycles (Becker et al 2010).  
These financial pressures are translated into the operations of corporations through the 
enveloping regime of maximising shareholder value as the primary objective. Agency theory 
has provided the rationale for this project, prioritising shareholders above all other 
participants in the corporation, and focusing corporate managers on the release of shareholder 
value incentivised by their own stock options. In turn this leads to an obsessive emphasis on 
financial performance measures, with increasingly short-term business horizons. However, as 
financial gains are realised they are not reinvested in advancing the corporation’s productive 
activity, but distributed to shareholders in dividend payments and share buy-backs (van der 
Zwan (2013: 108; Lazonick 2012). While enriching executives and shareholders, 






Finally the overwhelming embrace of finance is experienced in the increasing dependence of 
people on financial services and transactions in everyday life. The increasingly universal 
significance of defined contribution superannuation schemes, property mortgages, credit 
cards and mass-marketed financial services has created a world in which the apparent 
“democratisation of finance” has led to a convergence of finance and lifestyles (van der Zwan 
2013:111). However, in contrast to the public welfare and savings regimes of the past which 
were intended to mitigate lifecycle risks, the contemporary immersion in a profoundly 
financialised personal world acutely exposes individuals to the recurrent risks of the financial 
markets. This accumulation of an unrelenting international expansion of financial markets, 
the insistent financialisation of corporate objectives and values, and the subordination of 
whole populations to financial services exploded in the 2008 global financial crisis (Reich 
2008; Posner 2010). It was in this hollowing-out of the social responsibility of business that 
the US business corporation emerged as primarily a financial instrument. In this new 
financialized, de-materialized and de-humanized corporate world agency theory could be 
purveyed as the primary theoretical explanation, and shareholder value as the ultimate 
objective with impunity. In turn these new conceptions of the theory and objective of the firm 
became vital ingredients in the further financialization of corporations, markets and 
economies (Weinstein, 2012). 
 
Corporate Governance and Compounding Inequality 
There were very different paradigms of corporate governance before the arrival of 
financialisation in recent decades and the imposition of the grim hegemony of shareholder 
value. An emerging collective conception of the corporation is conveyed in the early work of 
Berle and Means (1932) who identified the collective nature of the corporate entity, the 
importance of managing multi-dimensional relationships, and the increasing accountability of 
the corporate entity with profound obligations to the wider community. Paradoxically Berle 
and Means left an ambiguous legacy (Cioffi 2011), that was subsequently interpreted in two 
alternative and sharply contrasting theorizations, one collective and collaborative, the other 
individualistic and contractual (Weinstein 2012). Throughout much of the 20th century the 
large modern enterprise was represented as a social institution, an organisation formed 
through collective action, and technological advance with wide social and economic purposes 





large corporation as an integrated, unified, collective entity that could not possibly be reduced 
to the sum of individuals it comprises (Weinstein 2012). Then in the later decades of the 20th 
century the view of the enterprise as a simple contractual arrangement, a nexus of contracts, 
and a mode of interaction between individuals became ascendant, providing the theoretical 
framework for the ultimately hegemonic agency theory and its insistence on shareholder 
primacy and shareholder value (Weinstein 2012; Aglietta and Reberioux 2005; Coase 1960; 
Alchian and Demsetz 1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).   
The modern corporation as typified by Berle and Means manifested the separation of 
ownership and control, where professional managers were able to determine the direction of 
the enterprise and shareholders had “surrendered a set of definite rights for a set of indefinite 
expectations” (Berle and Means 1932:244). After the New Deal and the end of the Second 
World War, US managers seized the opportunities newly open to them, and many US 
corporations grew massively in scale and market domination achieving a pre-eminent 
position in the world economy. A new managerial mode of coordination of enterprise, 
technology, and planning had arrived transcending the market (Chandler 1977).  
This was the era of Galbraith’s New Industrial State (1967) in which corporate growth and 
brand prestige appeared to displace profit maximisation as the goal of technocratic managers 
(Henwood 1998:259). In a technocratic milieu the shareholder was rendered “passive and 
functionless, remarkable only in his capacity to share without effort or appreciable risk, the 
gains from growth by which the technostructure measures its success” (Galbraith, 1967:356). 
This Galbraithian idyll was disintegrating by the time of the severe recession of the early 
1970s, with the incapacity of US corporations to compete effectively with Japanese and 
European products in important consumer market sectors, accompanied by a push by Wall 
Street towards conglomerate formation in the interests of managing multiple businesses by 
financial performance. “Over time purely financial interests have increasingly asserted their 
influence over hybridised giant corporations” (Henwood 1998:262).  
While the nexus of contracts theory preceded agency theory, and was the intellectual 
foundation upon which it was based, it was the cruder aspects of agency theory that became 
the dominant paradigm in business and law. The insistence on the collective and public 
nature of the new corporations which Berle and Means convincingly made and others 
including Galbraith and Chandler developed, invited a response from economists and lawyers 





determined and successful effort to impose “the reprivatisation of the corporation” (Ireland, 
2005; Weinstein 2012). 
The impact of these different modes of corporate governance upon the distribution of wealth 
become clear when Picketty and Saez (2003) now famous graph of the income share of the 
top ten decile  in the United States is considered (Figure 4). Following the dramatic fall of the 
income share of the top ten decile in the rigours of the New Deal, the Second World War, and 
post-war reconstruction, there was a long stable period in the income share of the top decile 
lasting from 1947 through to 1977 which coincides with the period the technocratic and 
egalitarian paradigm of the purposes of the corporation was in the ascendant. However as the 
tenets of financialisation, shareholder value and executive stock options begin to take off in 
the late 1970s with the publications of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980) and Fama 
and Jensen (1983) there is a sudden and prolonged surge in the income reward of the top 
decile which continues to the present day, and is beginning to threaten the level of inequality 
in the United States not witnessed since the 19
th
 century. This is not to suggest their very 
widely cited articles, which have dominated finance and economics for decades, were 
particularly influential in producing this sudden and atavistic return to extreme inequality, 
however their work certainly interpreted these changes in a benign light, and totally neglected 
their damaging social and economic outcomes. 
      Figure  4 
Top Ten Decile Income Share in the US 1917-2007 
 
Management theory and practice for some decades has been overwhelmed by this narrow and 
constricted view of the modern corporation. Agency theory, the dominant intellectual 
justification for the principle of shareholder primacy and the practice of maximising 
shareholder value, has become “a cornerstone of ... corporate governance” (Lan and 
Heracleous 2010: 294).  Agency theory is often regarded not only as the dominant current 
interpretation, but as an eternal and universal explanation of corporate governance. In fact 
agency theory is of recent origin, and is very much a product of the Anglo-American world. 
Rooted in finance and economics, it has somehow managed to penetrate not only policy and 
practice but the essential understanding of corporate law regarding directors’ duties. In 





agents) to ensure their interests do not diverge substantially from those of the principals (the 
shareholders), and to devote the company to maximising principals return (Fama 1980; Fama 
and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976).  Yet, despite its pre-eminence, agency theory 
is not only profoundly simplistic, but deeply flawed: 
• Agency theory focuses on an oversimplification of complex financial and business 
reality 
• Agency theory damagingly insists upon the single corporate objective of shareholder 
value 
• Agency theory misconceives the motivations of managers  
• Agency theory ignores the diversity of investment institutions and interests 
• Agency theory debilitates managers and corporations, and ultimately weakens 
economies 
• Agency achieves the opposite of its intended effect. 
As Didlier Cossin (2011), Professor of Finance at IMD, Switzerland has observed:  
“Most financial models taught today rely on false mathematical assumptions that create a 
sense of security even as failure approaches... The list of flawed theories (including agency 
theory)…are all finance models based on over-simplifying complex choices. This pretence 
that mathematical models are the solution for human problems is dangerous and is not only at 
the core of finance theory but is also in the heads of many corporate and financial managers. 
Given the tremendous changes in financial systems, these theories must be scrutinised and 
then abandoned as models for the future.”   
Not only does agency theory dangerously over-simplify the complexities of business 
relationships and decisions, but it damagingly demands a focus on a single objective. Agency 
theory asserts shareholder value as the ultimate corporate objective which managers are 
incentivised and impelled to pursue: “The crisis has shown that managers are often incapable 
of resisting pressure from shareholders. In their management decisions, the short-term market 
value counts more than the long-term health of the firm” (Segrestin, and Hatchuel 2011) 
Agency theory daring not to enter the “black box” of the firm itself, from a distance 





de-humanised stimulus/response mechanism: “The idea that all managers are self-interested 
agents who do not bear the full financial effects of their decisions (Jensen, and Meckling 
1976)  has provided an extraordinary edifice around which three decades  of agency research 
has been built, even though these assumptions  are simplistic and lead to a reductionist view 
of business, that is,  comprising two participants – managers (agents) and shareholders 
(principals)” (Pye and Pettigrew 2005). 
Agency theory tends to ignore the diversity of investment institutions and interests, and their 
variety of objectives and beneficiaries. As Lazonick (1992) has argued institutional investors 
are not monolithic and different types of institutional investors have different investment 
strategies and time horizons. Corporate governance becomes less of a concern if a share 
holding is a very transitory price based transaction, and much share trading today is computer 
generated, with rapid activity generated by abstract formulas.   While life insurance and 
pension funds do have longer term horizons, and often look to equity investments to offer 
durable and stable returns, the behaviour of other market participants is often focused on the 
shorter term, and more interested in immediate fluctuations in stock prices than in the 
implications of corporate governance for the future prospects of a company:  
“Pension fund managers can generally take a longer-term perspective on the returns to their 
portfolios than can the mutual-fund managers. Nevertheless even the pension funds (or 
insurance companies) are loath to pass up the gains that, in a speculative financial era, can be 
made by taking quick capital gains, and their managers may feel under personal pressure to 
match the performance of more speculative institutional investors. The more the institutional 
investors focus on the high returns to their financial portfolios needed to attract household 
savings and on the constant restructuring of their portfolios to maximize yields, the more 
their goals represent the antithesis of financial commitment. Driven by the need to compete 
for the public’s savings by showing superior returns, portfolio managers who invest for the 
long term may find themselves looking for new jobs in the short term” (Lazonick 1992).    
 
Maximising Shareholder Value 
Maximising shareholder value has proved a debilitating philosophy throughout large listed 
U.S. corporation for some decades. The corrosive impact of shareholder value imperatives is 





technology and finance industries. U.S. information technology companies, which led the 
world in 1990s innovation (Microsoft, IBM, Cisco, Intel, Hewlett-Packard), “spent more 
(much more except Intel) on stock buybacks than they spent on R & D in 2000-2009” 
(Lazonick 2012).  In the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, “many major US financial firms 
(including Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Wachovia, Washington Mutual, 
Fannie Mae), many of whom subsequently failed, had previously used up precious reserves in 
order to fund stock buybacks, which in turn made already over-compensated executives even 
wealthier.”  Lazonick asks why did senior executives willingly diminish the financial strength 
and resilience of major corporations in this reckless way?  
“The ideology of maximizing shareholder value is an ideology through which corporate 
executives have been able to enrich themselves. The economists’ and corporate executives’ 
mantra from 1980 until the 2007-2008 meltdown of shareholder value and the need to 
‘disgorge…free cash flow’ translated into executive option grants and stock buybacks, and 
resulted in increasing dramatically those executive options’ value” (Lazonick 2012).    
The power of the shareholder value model “has been ampliﬁed through its acceptance by a 
worldwide network of corporate intermediaries, including international law ﬁrms, the big 
accounting ﬁrms, and the principal investment banks and consulting ﬁrms – a network whose 
rapidly expanding scale give it exceptional inﬂuence in diffusing the ... model of shareholder-
centred corporate governance”  (Ireland 2005:77). 
The self-interest and irresponsibility inherent in the practice of pursuing shareholder value 
reached its zenith with the reckless excesses of the global financial crisis. William Bratton 
and Michael Wachter relate the activities of financial sector firms in the years and months 
leading to the financial crisis of 2007−2008: 
“For a management dedicated to maximizing shareholder value, the instruction manual was 
clear: get with the program by generating more risky loans and doing so with more leverage. 
Any bank whose managers failed to implement the [high risk strategy] got stuck with a low 
stock price. . . .Unsurprisingly, its managers laboured under considerable pressure to follow 
the strategies of competing banks” (Bratton, and Wachter 2010)   
This irresponsible behaviour has been widely recognized in post-crisis inquiry reports, and 
regulatory reforms across most jurisdictions now recommend that executive remuneration 





performance and responsibility (Blair 2012).   And yet even after the prolonged international 
reform process in the years following the financial crisis, the concept of shareholder primacy, 
and the concomitant insistence that the only real purpose of the corporation is to deliver 
shareholder value, has survived as an almost universal principle of corporate governance, and 
often goes unchallenged. This self-interested, tenacious and simplistic belief is corrosive of 
any effort to realise the deeper values companies are built upon, the wider purposes they 
serve, and the broader set of relationships they depend upon for their success.  The obsessive 
emphasis on shareholder value is an ideology that is constricting and misleading in business 
enterprise, and is intended to crowd out other relevant and viable strategies for business 
success.  
The primacy traditionally accorded to shareholder interests is most often justified on the basis 
that it is the means by which corporate law can most effectively secure aggregate social 
welfare (Hansmann and Kraakman 2001).  This view was perhaps most clearly and familiarly 
expressed by the economist Milton Friedman (1970) that “the social responsibility of 
business is to increase its profits.”   However, the question of whose interests should shape 
corporate operations and strategy has become contested under the corporate social and 
environmental responsibility movement. Should companies pursue the collective interest of 
shareholders exclusively or should they include other interests and wider social and 
environmental claims in their own right? 
As Margaret Blair persuasively argues, “to anyone who has worked for a corporation or 
observed the ways that corporations can externalise some of their costs onto employees, 
customers, or the communities where they the idea that maximising share value is equivalent 
to maximising the total social value created by the firm seems obviously wrong’. The long-
run maximization of share value is not the equivalent to maximising total social value. On the 
contrary, the in-the-long-run argument simply “fails to make a case that shareholders’ interest 
should be given precedence over other legitimate interests and goals of the corporation . . . 
Neither in theory nor in practice, is it true that maximizing the value of equity shares is the 
equivalent of maximizing the overall value created by the firm.” (Blair quoted by Ireland 
2005 p 143) 
This suggests that shareholder primacy is more accurately seen as a device for achieving a 
particular distribution of the product of productive activity than as a mechanism for achieving 





generally, involves “a shift in the internal social relationships within states in favour of 
creditor and rentier interests, with the subordination of productive sectors to financial sectors 
and with a drive to shift wealth and power and security away from the bulk of the working 
population” (Ireland 2005:31).  
As the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2014) indicate the ownership of all 
financial assets in the U.S. is heavily skewed towards the top 5 per cent of the population 
who by 2013 possessed more than 60 per cent of these assets, while the bottom 50 per cent of 
the population barely have any financial assets (Figure 5). However Wolff (2012) highlights 
that U.S. financial securities and business equity are the most heavily skewed financial assets 
in their distribution, with just 1 per cent of the population owning 64 per cent of financial 
securities and the next 9 per cent of the population owning 30 per cent of these assets. 
Similarly with business equity one per cent of the U.S. population own 61 per cent of 
business equity and the next 9 per cent of the population own 31 per cent of business equity. 
Therefore in essence the elevated mantra of the maximisation of shareholder value effectively 
boils down to devoting corporations to the financial interests of 1 per cent of the U.S. 
population, and at best 10 per cent of the population. The crudeness of the avarice and 
recklessness that underlies the maximisation of shareholder value is most clearly 
demonstrated in the massive, continuing and irresponsible inflation in executive pay during 
the last three decades. 
 
Figure  5  
Share of All Financial Assets by Net Worth Group in US 
 
Figure   6          
US Distribution of Investment Assets 2010 
 
5. Executive Pay 
It is important to remember that though hundreds of millions of dollars are routinely paid to 
the leading CEOs and financial institution executives in the United States, and though the 





the U.S. is deeply disfigured by the mounting, severe, and very visible inequality. While CEO 
salaries inflated through the roof in the era from the 1990s to the present day, average 
earnings in America actually went down (EPI 2015). In this re-invention of inequality the 
U.S. led the world  “The share of total income going to top income groups has risen 
dramatically in recent decades in the United States and in many other (but not all) 
countries”(Atkinson, Picketty and Saez 2011:6). How did this insistent inequality reappear in 
the industrial world, what are its causes, and what are the consequences? 
Executive remuneration began to explode in the late 1980s and early 1990s when executives 
began to be encouraged to align their thinking more closely with shareholders by receiving 
equity based pay. Jensen and Murphy (1990a and 1990b) asked the rhetorical question “Why 
pay executives like bureaucrats?” The apparent answer to this question was to load 
executives up with equity pay until this became the lion’s share of their remuneration (Hall 
2003). The purpose was to focus and enhance executive’s performance on achieving returns 
to shareholders: equity based compensation was intended as the silver bullet to achieve 
higher rates of shareholder value. However the critical flaw in this plan is that executives, 
who were running the company and could influence the performance of the company to serve 
their own purposes, effectively seized control of their own reward structures: 
“Flawed compensation arrangements have not been limited to a small number of ‘bad 
apples’; they have been widespread, persistent and systemic. Furthermore, the problems have 
not resulted from temporary mistakes or lapses of judgement that boards can be expected to 
correct on their own; rather they have stemmed from structural defects in the underlying 
governance structure that enables executives to exert considerable influence over their 
boards. The absence of effective arm’s-length dealing under today’s system of corporate 
governance has been the primary source of problematic compensation arrangements. Finally, 
while recent reforms that seek to increase board independence will likely improve matters, 
they will not be sufficient to make boards adequately accountable; much more needs to be 
done” (Bebchuk and Fried 2005:2). 
During the boom years of the 1990s there was a rapid and sustained escalation in CEO 
salaries in the United States, and any expected adjustment downwards in executive reward 
with the market crash of 2001, and the halving of the market capitalisation of many large 
corporations, did not occur. Though there were more stringent efforts to link CEO 





the companies they managed did well or not. Extremely lucrative share option schemes 
continued, and if the options packages became more sophisticated, there were many devices 
such as backdating widely employed to ensure executives extracted the best possible reward 
from their options. This pattern has continued to the present day: whatever reductions in their 
remuneration (if any) CEOs experienced during the financial crisis were quickly restored in 
the period after the crisis, and soon were as extravagant as they had ever been before. Stock 
options in the US proved the route to enriching not just brilliant software entrepreneurs but 
any CEO of an S & P 100 who stayed in office long enough to massage the company 
accounts. 
Figure   7 
Top five US CEOs annual remuneration vs. top five US fund managers CEOs 2013 
 
Figure 7 indicates the total remuneration of the five highest paid CEOs in the US in 2014. 
Included in the compensation figures are base salary, bonuses, benefits, long term incentive 
plans, and profits from cashing out on stock options where this information was accessible. 
U.S. executive salaries are the most inflated in the world, followed by the UK, while 
executive salaries in Europe are generally more modest, and in Japan are much lower. Claims 
that such extravagant salaries are required to incentivise U.S. CEOs and create greater 
alignment between their interests and those of the shareholders scarcely stand scrutiny: 
despite the sophisticated formulas often employed in complex compensation packages, all too 
often extravagant CEO salaries have little connection to performance measured in terms of 
shareholder returns, peer performance, or any measure of stakeholder values. Of course CEO 
salaries are only a part of wider structures of inequality that have become more extreme in 
recent years, and rewards for executives in the finance sector have become even more 
astronomically inflated (Figure 7) with billions of dollars being paid to the small group of top 
hedge fund directors. (When the leaders of the hedge funds were hauled into the U.S. 
Congress House Committee investigating the financial crisis George Soros admitted that 
“more regulation of the financial system is needed in order to reign in the greed that 
ultimately creates unsustainable economic bubbles” New York Times 13 November 2008).  
As Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century (2014) graphically demonstrates western 
economies led by the United States have been drifting back into levels of inequality not 





unequal societies in the world, there has been a rediscovery of philanthropy with both Bill 
Gates and Warren Buffet eager to give their vast $70+ billion fortunes away to help solve the 
most deep-seated problems of the world. Mark Zuckerberg has responded to this by 
channelling some company stock and his own money into public education. But earlier in the 
20th century both corporations and individuals were taxed at a level that enabled 
governments to meet these problems of social need and equality of opportunity, not the 
super-rich. 
The essential problem is not the unrestrained and absolute growth in CEO reward, however 
morally dubious that is in organisations where CEOs are expected to be setting an example of 
ethical behaviour rather than greed, it is the wider impact of the obsessive focus on CEO 
reward systems in Anglo-American corporations. Firstly there is the debilitating displacement 
of goals as the objectives of the corporation under the leadership of equity incentivised CEOs 
switches from the single minded focus on the development and success of the company to 
highly individualistic CEO strategies on how to align the performance of the corporation with 
the maximisation of their personal earnings. Secondly how the arrogation of an increasing 
share of the wealth of the corporation by the CEO impacts upon relationships with other 
employees, shareholders and the wider community, as CEOs become increasingly remote 
from the material concerns of the rest of the people. 
The displacement of CEO goals is not a recent problem but occurred in earlier periods in 
different forms, for example in earlier periods of merger and takeover activity, often the most 
insistent driver was CEOs’ ambition, since they associated acquisitions with higher rewards 
for themselves. Similarly the sustained lack of capital investment in US and UK industry in 
the 1970s and 1980s was partly due to the self-interest of management: “The problem was 
not only the high cost and mobility of capital. The problem was also the willingness of many 
top managers of industrial corporations to take advantage of the permissive financial 
environment to appropriate huge levels of compensation for themselves while neglecting to 
build organizational capabilities in the companies they were supposed to lead” (Lazonick 
1992:476). However the displacement of goals since the introduction of equity-based pay for 
CEOs has become systemic, and now agreeing the elaborate design the CEO remuneration 
package is one of the principal roles of boards of directors. For example in the celebrated 
downfall of WorldCom the report prepared for the District Court of New York stated: “The 





with more than $30 billion in revenue, while the WorldCom Compensation Committee met as 
often as 17 times per year” (Breedon 2003:31). 
 
Figure 8 
Ratio of CEO-to-worker compensation in the United States 1965-2014 
As critical as the detachment of US executives from their corporations and shareholders’ 
interests that occurred from the 1990s, was the distance that grew between the rewards and 
lifestyle of executives and their employees and other stakeholders. In 1980 the ratio of CEO 
and worker compensation in the US was approximately 50:1, and by 1990 this had risen to a 
ratio of 109:1. With the meteoric rise in executive pay in the 1990s the ratio expanded 
inexorably to an unprecedented 376:1 in 2002 (Figure 8).  After the fall-out from the Enron 
and WorldCom collapses and the introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley regulation there was a 
sharp dip in this ratio, which quickly recovered with the excesses that led to the global 
financial crisis. The post-crisis regulatory intervention put a check of executive excess for a 
short while, but with the public stimulus led recovery CEO salaries returned to a ratio of 
303:1 compared to worker pay. Though there was productivity growth during this era almost 
all the benefits went to top management: as Dew-Becker and Gordon who examined the 
distribution of the benefits of growth in the US comment ‘Our results show the dominant 
share of real income gains accruing to the top 10 per cent and top 1 per cent is almost as large 
for labour income as total income … It is not that all gains went to capital and none to labour; 
rather, our finding is that the share of gains that went to labour went to the very top of the 
distribution of wage and salary incomes’ (2005:77). In two decades US workers saw no 
measurable improvement in their wages, while US executives enjoyed the experience of 
becoming multi-millionaires en masse. This is hardly a recipe for a well integrated and 
orderly economy and society, and it is not surprising that the US now has among the worst 
social and health problems of any advanced industrial country. 
The elaborate structures designed to link executive reward to performance has often 
compounded the problems rather than alleviating them, and too often CEO compensation is 
not due to achieving results but has amounted to rewards for failure (Trade and Industry 
Committee 2003). Essentially the extraordinary elevation in executive reward that occurred in 
the 1990s (and has continued since) in the United States had little to do with the productive 





history. The sustained rise in share prices in this period reflected institutional savings flows 
and momentum investing, together with falling interest rates. Stock options became an 
accelerator mechanism providing risk free bonuses to senior management. “Corporate 
governance in the 1990s operated against a background of rising share prices, the capital 
market was not an agent of discipline but a facilitator of painless general enrichment through 
rising share prices; amidst increasing confusion about what management could do in a world 
whose stock market was running on narratives (not discounted cash flows) and encouraging 
CEOs to pose as heroes … Many CEOs in the decade of the 1990s profited personally from 
using the language of value creation to cover the practice of value skimming” (Ertuck et al 
2004). 
When companies do use objective criteria for setting CEO compensation these criteria are not 
designed to reward managers for their own contribution to the firm’s performance, as bonuses 
are typically not based on the firm’s operating performance or earnings increases relative to 
its industrial peers, but on metrics that cannot distinguish the contribution of industry wide or 
market wide movements. In fact conventional stock options allowed executives to gain from 
any increase in stock price above the grant-date market value, even when their company’s 
performance might have significantly lagged that of their peers. 
 
Figure   9 
Change in CEO pay and Average Worker Pay in the UK 1980-2013 (UK £) 
There is a real danger that the excessive compensation secured by US executives is becoming 
the benchmark for executive reward in other regions of the world where up till now executive 
rewards have remained modest in comparison, and executive have pursued a balanced set of 
corporate objectives rather than their personal remuneration. The out of control inflation in 
executive pay in the United States threatens to impact upon executive reward internationally, 
beginning with the UK where CEO salaries were a small fraction of US CEO salaries until 
1998 when a sharp and sustained inflation in CEO pay occurred (Figure 9). In the past there 
was some resistance to this as business executives in Europe and Asia were less enamoured 
to the short term orientations of the U.S. counterparts, and identified with the sustained 
successof the companies they led rather than celebrating their own reward.   However more 
European and Asian executives look upon swollen US executive salaries as a benchmark to 





compensation and in incentive payments in other parts of the world, which were significant 
stages in the acceleration of the inflation of US executive pay. It may be questioned whether 
executive performance pay should be in the form of stock options at all, since these create an 
incentive for management to manage performance of financial results in order to maximise 
share price. Pay for performance in the form of bonuses might better be linked to the 
underlying drivers of performance that impact on the financials, and to non-financial 
performance indicators in a more balanced scorecard. The focus could then be upon 
management for sustainability, rather than short term performance management aimed at the 
stock price (Clarke 2016a). 
 
6. Conclusions 
The debate in corporate governance for the last two decades has focused on how to align 
executive performance with shareholder value. Many of the developments in reform, 
regulation, standards and best practices were inspired by this single principle. This in effect 
was an atavistic return to narrow 19
th
 century views of the purposes of the corporation, but in 
the contemporary context of an increasingly financialised conception of the corporation and 
its objectives. The result has been a mode of corporate governance that has aggressively 
compounded inequality in the economy and society, and directed corporations to the interests 
of a very small and very rich section of the community. The tenet of maximising shareholder 
value, to the extent that it has been adhered to by corporations, has devoted the value 
generated by corporate activity to servicing the increasing wealth of rich shareholders rather 
than the interests of all stakeholders in the corporation. At the pinnacle of this effort and 
driving the dynamic of the unequal distribution of value are CEOs who in the U.S., and 
increasingly in other countries, have been massively rewarded for their efforts. This system is 
unacceptable not simply because it is amoral and inequitable, but because it is incapable of 
conceiving of and acting on the essential purposes of corporations defined as the “delivery of 
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Figure 2  Share of global wealth of the top 1% and bottom 99% respectively; the dashed lines project 

























Source: Credit Suisse Global Wealth Report 2015; Credit Suisse Data 2000-2014; Oxfam Issue Briefing, 




















Figure  3     Financial Assets in Multiples of GDP 
 
 




















Figure  4    Top Ten Decile Income Share in the US 1917-2007 
 
























































Figure 6        US Distribution of Investment Assets 2010rends e:  
 
Source:  Wolff, E. N. (2012). The Asset Price Meltdown and the Wealth of the Middle Class, National Bureau 
of Economic Research Working Paper No 18559, New York: New York University             
http://www.ecineq.org/ecineq_bari13/FILESxBari13/CR2/p17.pdf        G.W. Donhoff (2013), Wealth, Income 
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Figure   7    Top five US CEOs annual remuneration vs. top five US fund managers CEOs 2013 
 
 
Source: Forbes (2014), CEO Compensation, 25 Highest Earning Hedge Fund Managers and Traders  
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2014/02/26/the-highest-earning-hedge-fund-managers-and-traders/;   


































































Figure 8   Ratio of CEO-to-worker compensation in the United States 1965-2014 
 
Note: CEO annual compensation is computed using the options realized compensation series, which includes salary, bonus, restricted stock 
grants, options exercised, and long-term incentive payouts for CEOs at the top 350 U.S. firms ranked by sales.  
 
Source: Economic Policy Institute 2014. Authors' analysis of data from Compustat's ExecuComp database, Current Employment Statistics 









































Figure   9      Change in CEO pay and Average Worker Pay in the UK 1980-2013   (UK £) 
 
 
Source: High Pay Centre, Reform Agenda: how to Make Top Pay Fairer, Final Report, 2014 
http://highpaycentre.org/files/Reform_Agenda_Final_Report.pdf 
 
